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ABSTRACT 
This paper explores the role of inward foreign direct investment (FDI) as a determinant of 
domestic firms’ wages, namely wage spillovers. We first construct a theoretical model to 
demonstrate that the presence of FDI firms affects domestic firms’ expected average wages via 
productivity spillovers and a cut-off capability. We then estimate FDI-induced wage spillovers 
by employing IV-GMM estimator with a five-year panel dataset of a growing service industry 
in Vietnam. Despite FDI firms on average pay 2.25 times that of domestic firms, they put a 
downward pressure on domestic firms’ wages. A one percent increase in FDI presence causes 
domestic firms to cut average wages by 2.03 percent. The estimations also find that firm-
specific features are attributable to significant differences in their wages as well as FDI-linked 
wage spillovers.            
KEYWORDS: FDI, Wage spillovers, IV-GMM, Service industry, Vietnam    
JEL CLASSIFICATION: D22, D62, F23, J20, J30  
2 
 
I. Introduction         
The inflow of foreign direct investment (FDI) can exert considerable influence on various 
aspects of host economies, for example the labour market. The literature on the labour-market 
impact of FDI can be categorized into three main strands. The first strand focuses on the 
employment effect, namely foreign firms can create new jobs, directly and indirectly, for local 
workers (Axarloglou and Pournarakis 2007, Coniglio, Prota, and Seric 2015, Harding and 
Javorcik 2011). The second strand emphasizes the role of FDI in enhancing human capital 
accumulation and labour productivity of the host workforce (Newman et al. 2015, Javorcik 
2004, Aitken, Harrison, and Lipsey 1996, Kathuria 2001). The third strand examines the impact 
of FDI firms on local wages, to which our study relates.   
A substantial body of the FDI-wage literature investigates the wage gaps between foreign 
and domestic firms. Empirical evidence suggests that foreign firms tend to pay higher wages 
than domestic counterparts (Conyon et al. 2002, Görg, Strobl, and Walsh 2007, Huang and 
Zhang 2017). Foreign wage premium unambiguously benefits workers in FDI firms, 
particularly high-skilled labour (Chaudhuri and Banerjee 2010, Taylor and Driffield 2005, 
Anwar and Sun 2012). Nevertheless, whether workers in domestic firms (accounting for an 
overwhelming share of the local workforce) are better-off from the presence of FDI firms 
remains a significant knowledge gap in the FDI-wage literature. 
This paper contributes to filling the gap by providing both theoretical and empirical 
evidence on the FDI impact on wages of workers in domestic firms, namely wage spillovers. 
The literature on FDI-induced wage spillovers shows scant and mixed evidence for both 
developed and developing host economies. In this study, we construct a theoretical model to 
illustrate channels that FDI-linked wage spillovers take place in the local labour market. The 
model shows that the presence of FDI firms affects domestic firms’ expected wage rate, 
conditional on they enter the market, directly via productivity spillovers and indirectly via a 
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cut-off capability. The theoretical model provides a guidance for the subsequent empirical 
estimation and interpretation of the findings.  
Furthermore, this study focuses on a service industry, which differs from the existing FDI 
literature that is largely devoted to manufacturing industries. According to UNCTAD (2017), 
global inward FDI in services surged fourfold from US$4 trillion (in 2001) to US$16 trillion 
(in 2015), accounting for about two-thirds of global FDI stock while primary and 
manufacturing sectors contributed 6 percent and 26 percent, respectively. Given the growing 
importance of the services sector and the increasingly dominant FDI inflows to services, it is 
of policy and analytical interest to investigate the impact of services FDI on the recipient 
economies in depth.  
Our empirical analysis employs a firm-level panel dataset of Vietnam’s tourism industry 
during 2009–2013. Owing to its rich natural, cultural, and human resources, Vietnam has 
become an increasingly attractive destination for both foreign investors and visitors. Notably, 
the country has been ranked the 12th in the world’s top prospective host economies for 2017–
2019 (UNCTAD, 2017) and the 10th in the top fastest growing destinations for leisure travel 
spending for 2016–2026 (WEF, 2017). Furthermore, this industry represents the second largest 
employer within the services sector of the country, following wholesale and retails (GSO, 
2017). Therefore, Vietnam, particularly its tourism industry, offers an interesting case study 
and the empirical findings from this paper are expected to shed light on the wider impact of 
services FDI in host developing labour markets. 
The remaining paper is organized as follows. Section II reviews the literature. Section III 
constructs a theoretical model to examine the impact of FDI on domestic firms’ wages. Section 
IV presents the econometric specification and estimation strategy. Section V describes the data. 
Section VI provides empirical results and discussions. Section VII concludes the paper and 
discusses policy implications.        
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II. Related literature 
The pioneering work on FDI-linked wage spillovers was conducted by Aitken, Harrison, 
and Lipsey (1996) for manufacturing sector in Mexico, Venezuela and the US. Although FDI 
firms pay higher wages in all three countries, wage spillovers only exist in the US.  Two other 
related studies, namely Feliciano and Lipsey (2006) and Axarloglou and Pournarakis (2007), 
extend the analysis for the US, using different datasets. While the former suggests mixed 
findings during 1974-1994 (i.e., positive spillovers in the non–manufacturing and insignificant 
spillovers in manufacturing), the latter reveals weak effects of FDI on local wages in most 
states in the years 1987 and 1992. For the case of Mexico, Villarreal and Sakamoto (2011) 
provide more recent evidence that the increased presence of foreign firms leads to higher wages 
paid by domestic counterparts in the same regional labour markets. 
With a similar attempt and approach, Girma, Greenaway, and Wakelin (1999) examine 
wage and productivity spillovers from FDI to UK manufacturing firms. Using firm-level data 
(1991-1996), the study finds five and 10 percent higher wages and labour productivity of FDI 
firms, respectively. Meanwhile, no wage and productivity spillovers are found. On the contrary, 
Driffield and Girma (2003) suggest evidence of positive wage spillovers from FDI to UK 
electronics firms during 1980-1992. Spillovers are uniformly distributed across regions for 
skilled workers and are more pronounced for unskilled workers in areas with high 
unemployment levels. 
Barry, Gorg, and Strobl (2005) estimate the impact of FDI on wages of domestic exporters 
and non–exporters in Ireland’s manufacturing industries, using firm-level data (1990-1998). 
The findings suggest negative spillovers to domestic exporting firms. The result is attributable 
to the crowding-out effect of FDI through the labour market, where FDI firms poach the best 
workers away from local counterparts using higher wages. Meanwhile, domestic non–
exporting firms appear to neither benefit nor suffer from foreign presence.   
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Muñoz-Bullón and Sánchez-Bueno (2013) analyze the intra-industry wage spillovers in 
Spanish manufacturing industries, employing firm level panel data (1992-2008). The 
estimations reveal no significant evidence of wage spillovers from FDI at an aggregate level 
after controlling for firm specific characteristics. Further examination of labour skills of 
domestic firms shows that only workers in domestic firms that employs a highly skilled 
workforce will benefit from wage spillovers.   
Pittiglio, Reganati, and Sica (2015) test for wage spillovers from FDI to Italian firms via 
horizontal and vertical channels. Using a firm-level dataset (2002-2007), the research fails to 
identify any spillovers from FDI by both channels. Nevertheless, significant vertical wage 
spillovers are found when technology gap (between domestic and foreign firms) is included. 
Accordingly, domestic firms with small or medium gaps benefit from wage spillovers while 
domestic firms with large gaps suffer.  
The FDI–linked wage spillover effect is also mixed for host developing countries. Lipsey 
and Sjöholm (2004) test for wage spillovers from FDI to Indonesian manufacturing firms in 
1996. The study takes into account the impact of workers’ education levels. Significant positive 
wage spillovers are found for both white–collar and blue–collar workers. Tomohara and Takii 
(2011) also find the positive wage spillovers to Indonesian manufacturing firms, using a panel 
dataset from 1989 to 1996.  
Hale and Long (2011) examine wage spillovers from FDI to Chinese firms in manufacturing 
and service industries, using a dataset of 1,500 firms in 2001. The estimation results show that 
foreign presence positively affects domestic private firms’ wages while exerts no impact on 
state-owned firms’ wages. Elliott and Zhou (2015) also investigate the case of China but focus 
on manufacturing firms only. Using cross-sectional data in 2004, the paper supports the results 
by Hale and Long (2011).     
6 
 
Chidambaran Iyer (2012) contributes to the FDI-linked wage spillover literature by 
analysing the case of Indian manufacturing firms from 1989 to 2004. While foreign presence 
measured at the three-digit level shows negative wage spillovers, measurement at the four-digit 
level indicates a positive effect on domestic firms’ average wages. Also enriching the literature 
on this strand, Srithanpong (2014) explores the role of inward FDI as a determinant of pay 
levels by manufacturing firms in Thailand. The estimations based on the sectoral data in 2007 
support positive wage spillovers from foreign firms at both regional and industry levels.  
To the best of our knowledge, Hoi and Pomfret (2010) is the only study examining FDI-
linked wage spillovers for the case of Vietnam. The paper focuses on private firms in the 
manufacturing industries, using data from 2000 to 2010. The findings indicate significant 
positive wage spillovers from FDI to domestic counterparts. While horizontal spillovers occur 
regardless of labour market conditions and firms' characteristics, vertical spillovers depend on 
firms and industries’ characteristics. Only domestic firms in the low technology industries, of 
small and medium size, and with training can benefit from vertical spillovers. 
[Insert Table 1 here] 
As summarized in Table 1, existing studies find rather mixed evidence on FDI-induced wage 
spillovers in both developed and developing economies. The inconclusive results might be due 
to that most studies are country-specific and employ different subsets of data over different 
periods. While a metadata analysis can provide deeper insights into the role of development 
status, the reviewed papers seem to suggest that FDI firms tend to generate more significant 
wage spillovers in host developing countries than in developed ones. Notably, empirical studies 
predominantly focus on manufacturing industries whereas none of them is dedicated to a 
service industry. This paper extends the literature by constructing a theoretical model to 
illustrate channels of wage spillovers from FDI and then applying to a rich panel dataset of 
firms in the rising tourism service industry in Vietnam over the period 2009-2013. 
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III. Theoretical model 
Labour demand  
In a monopolistically competitive product market, firms employ workers from the local 
labour market to produce outputs. On the demand side of the product market, a representative 
consumer has the following constant elasticity of substitution (CES) utility function:   
𝑈𝑈 = �∫ 𝑞𝑞(𝜔𝜔)𝜌𝜌𝑑𝑑𝜔𝜔𝜔𝜔∈Ω �
1
𝜌𝜌                                    (1) 
where 𝜔𝜔 indexes the products; Ω refers to the set of all available products; q is the quantity of 
consumption. All products are substitutes for each other (0 < ρ < 1) and have a constant 
elasticity of substitution of 
1
1−𝜌𝜌
 . Maximization of utility function, subject to a budget 
constraint, yields the following demand function: 
𝑞𝑞 = Φ𝑝𝑝
1
𝜌𝜌−1                                                 (2) 




 measures the level of aggregate demand; and Y is the 
consumer’s income. Each firm takes Φ as given because they are small in sizes relative to the 
industry. Therefore, the impact of a change in each firm’s output on the industry’s aggregate 
demand (Φ) is negligible. 
On the production side, the industry consists of both domestic and FDI firms located in 
different regions of the country, where γ measures the level of foreign presence in the industry-
region (0 ≤ γ ≤ 1). Upon entry into the industry, each firm pays a fixed entry cost, including 
costs of business registration and market research. After entering the industry and paying the 
fixed cost of production (f) (e.g., setting up plant and purchasing machine), firms employ one 
unit of labour to produce s units of output.  
The production process can be described by the production function F(l) = sl, where l is 
labour used and s is labour productivity. Labour productivity (s) depends on firm-specific 
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observed characteristics (𝜂𝜂) (for example, size, ownership, age and capital intensity)1 and 
unobserved capability endowment (θ). The capability endowment is randomly drawn from a 




, 𝜃𝜃 ≥ 𝜃𝜃   
   0,𝜃𝜃 < 𝜃𝜃                
      (3) 
where 𝜇𝜇 is a shape parameter and 𝜃𝜃 is the minimum value of θ. 
Moreover, the FDI literature suggests that the presence of FDI firms with advantageous 
assets (such as technological know–how, managerial and marketing skills, export experience 
and reputation) can affect labour productivity of domestic firms, causing productivity 
spillovers (Newman et al. 2015, Javorcik 2004, Kathuria 2001). Thus, labour productivity of 
domestic firm i depends on the firm characteristics (η), capability endowment (θ), and foreign 
presence (γ) as follows:  
𝑠𝑠 = 𝜂𝜂𝜃𝜃𝑒𝑒𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼                           
where parameter α captures the sign and the magnitude of the FDI–induced productivity 
spillover effect. A positive value of this parameter implies that FDI firms enhance the 
productivity of domestic firms. On the contrary, the negative value of this parameter suggests 




 units of labour are employed to produce one unit of output, the marginal cost 
of production for domestic firm i can be written as: 




      
where MC represents marginal cost of production and w denotes the firm’s wage offer. If the 
productivity spillover is positive, an increase in foreign presence reduces domestic firms’ 
marginal cost of production, everything else being equal. 
 




𝜆𝜆4   
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Given the MC, the profit of domestic firm i can be written as follows: 
𝜋𝜋 = �𝑝𝑝 − 𝑤𝑤
𝜂𝜂𝜃𝜃𝑒𝑒𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼� 𝑞𝑞 − 𝑓𝑓                  (4) 




Substituting this condition into the profit function, the optimal profit for firm i can be 








𝜌𝜌−1 − 𝑓𝑓      (5) 
The firm will enter the industry if it makes non-negative profit (𝜋𝜋∗ ≥ 0). The condition 𝜋𝜋∗ =









𝜌𝜌      (6) 
Equation (6) implies that if FDI-induced productivity spillover effect is positive (𝛼𝛼 > 0), an 
increase in foreign presence leads to a decrease in the cut-off capability of domestic firms. 
Subsequently, the lower cut-off capability allows more firms to enter and survive in the 
industry. Given the demand function and optimal pricing, the optimal quantity produced by 
firm i is derived as below: 




𝜌𝜌−1                     
Using the production function (F(l) = sl), we can obtain the labour demand (𝑙𝑙𝑑𝑑) of domestic 











1−𝜌𝜌�𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼                  










𝜌𝜌 𝜇𝜇 ∫𝜂𝜂𝜇𝜇𝑔𝑔�(𝜂𝜂)𝑑𝑑𝜂𝜂   (7) 
where 𝑔𝑔�(𝜂𝜂) is the probability density function of 𝜂𝜂; and 𝜇𝜇 > 𝜌𝜌
1−𝜌𝜌




Labour supply  
In each region, workers are faced with job offers from firms in the region. If a worker rejects 
job offers, s/he will enjoy leisure. The value of such leisure is the worker’s reservation wage 
(𝑤𝑤𝑟𝑟), and a job offer will only be accepted if it is higher than the worker’s reservation wage. 
The reservation wage depends on various factors. For example, individuals with high 
qualifications or having children might have higher reservation wages. In addition, job seekers 
in a region with high unemployment rate might have lower reservation wages because of the 
unfavourable job market. We assume the reservation wage is exogenously distributed, with a 
distribution function being 𝑔𝑔(𝑤𝑤𝑟𝑟).  
Each region has a labour endowment, namely 𝐿𝐿�. For simplicity, we assume that workers 
make decision on whether to accept a job offer in a first–come–first–accept manner, namely 
they will accept a job offer as long as its wage rate is higher than their reservation wage, and 
will not hold an acceptable job offer to wait for better offers. This non-strategic behaviour 
facilitates the formulation of labour supply function, and it is the case when firms’ job offers 
require workers to make decisions in a very short time frame.  
Subsequently the aggregate labour supply with which firms are faced is the labour 
endowment in the region, times the probability that the firm’s job offer is accepted, as follows:  
𝐿𝐿𝑠𝑠(𝑤𝑤) = 𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃(𝑤𝑤 ≥ 𝑤𝑤𝑟𝑟) = 𝐿𝐿 ∫ 𝑔𝑔(𝑤𝑤𝑟𝑟)𝑑𝑑𝑤𝑤0 𝑤𝑤
𝑟𝑟    (8) 
Assume that 𝑤𝑤𝑟𝑟  is uniformly distributed over the interval �0,𝑤𝑤𝑟𝑟� with 𝑤𝑤𝑟𝑟  is the upper bound 
of the reservation wage in region j, the labour supply facing domestic firm i can be expressed 
as below: 
𝐿𝐿𝑠𝑠(𝑤𝑤) = 𝐿𝐿 𝑤𝑤
𝑤𝑤𝑟𝑟
      (9) 
Note that the term 𝐿𝐿
𝑤𝑤𝑟𝑟
 is region specific and does not vary across firms.  
The equilibrium 
Equating the aggregate demand of labour (𝐿𝐿𝑑𝑑) with the aggregate supply of labour (𝐿𝐿𝑠𝑠), we 
can derive the equilibrium wage rate (𝑤𝑤∗) as follows: 
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2+𝜇𝜇𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼        (10) 
Later in our empirical estimation, the equilibrium wage rate is unobserved. Instead, we have 
data of firm average wage. Motivated by the equilibrium wage rate in equation (10), we specify 
the average wage function as below: 
𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑤𝑤 = 𝛽𝛽�0 + 𝛽𝛽�1lnΦ + 𝛽𝛽�2ln
𝑤𝑤𝑟𝑟
𝐿𝐿
+ 𝛽𝛽�3𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝜂𝜂 + 𝛽𝛽�4𝛼𝛼 + 𝛽𝛽�5𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝜃𝜃                              (11) 
where 𝑤𝑤 represents average wage and  𝛽𝛽�s are coefficients. Note that the equilibrium wage in 
equation (10) has industry-region-time variations while the firm average wage has firm-
industry-region-time variations. Accordingly, we add firm characteristics and capability 
endowment to capture the firm-level variations in the data. 
The firm will only survive in the industry and pay wages to employees, if it makes profit. 
That is, firms are observed in the sample only if its capability endowment is higher than the 
cut-off level (θ ≥ θ*). Therefore, the conditional expectation of the firm’s average wage can be 
derived as follows: 
𝐸𝐸[𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑤𝑤| 𝜃𝜃 ≥ 𝜃𝜃∗] = 𝛽𝛽�0 + 𝛽𝛽�1lnΦ + 𝛽𝛽�2ln
𝑤𝑤𝑟𝑟
𝐿𝐿
+ 𝛽𝛽�3𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝜂𝜂 + 𝛽𝛽�4𝛼𝛼 + 𝛽𝛽�5𝐸𝐸[𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝜃𝜃|𝜃𝜃 ≥ 𝜃𝜃∗]                     (12) 
                                   Direct  Indirect   
Equation (12) indicates that the expected average wage by domestic firm i depends on 
aggregate demand level (Φ), regional fixed effect (𝑤𝑤
𝑟𝑟
𝐿𝐿
), firm’s characteristics (η), capability 
endowment and foreign presence (γ). Note that FDI presence affects the firm’s average wage 
through two channels: (i) direct impact via productivity spillovers (𝛽𝛽�4 which is a monotone 
increasing function of α) and (ii) indirect impact via the cut-off capability (𝜃𝜃∗). 
Using the Pareto distribution given in equation (3), we can derive the conditional probability 




𝑔𝑔(𝜃𝜃|𝜃𝜃 ≥ 𝜃𝜃∗) = �
𝜇𝜇(𝜃𝜃∗)𝜇𝜇
𝜃𝜃𝜇𝜇+1 , 𝜃𝜃 ≥ 𝜃𝜃
∗   
   0, 𝜃𝜃 < 𝜃𝜃∗                
 
Therefore, the conditional expectation of the firm capability endowment can be written as: 





+ 𝜇𝜇2 �𝜌𝜌−1𝜌𝜌 � 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙Φ +
𝜇𝜇2𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑤𝑤 − 𝜇𝜇2𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝜂𝜂 − 𝜇𝜇2𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼 + 𝜇𝜇2 �1−𝜌𝜌𝜌𝜌 � 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑓𝑓 + 𝜇𝜇          (13) 
By differentiating equation (12) with respect to γ given the information in equation (13), we 
can derive the marginal impact of foreign presence on the expected equilibrium wage rate of 
domestic firm i as follows: 
𝜕𝜕𝐸𝐸�𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑤𝑤�𝜃𝜃 ≥ 𝜃𝜃∗�
𝜕𝜕𝛼𝛼
= 𝛽𝛽�4 + 𝛽𝛽�5
𝜕𝜕𝐸𝐸[𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝜃𝜃|𝜃𝜃≥𝜃𝜃∗]
𝜕𝜕𝛼𝛼
= 𝛽𝛽�4 − 𝛽𝛽�5
2𝜇𝜇2
2+𝜇𝜇
𝛼𝛼                      (14) 
        Direct           Indirect         Direct    Indirect 
 Equation (14) illustrates that foreign presence impacts the expected average wage via two 
contrasting channels. For instance, if positive productivity spillovers exist (i.e., α > 0 or 𝛽𝛽�4 >
0), the direct effect of an increase in FDI presence on the domestic firm’s wage is positive. 
Meanwhile, the indirect effect is negative as it decreases the cut–off capability, putting a 
downward pressure on the expected average wage (i.e., −𝛽𝛽�5
2𝜇𝜇2
2+𝜇𝜇
𝛼𝛼 < 0). The ultimate impact 
of FDI presence on the firm wage depends on the relative strength of these two channels2.  
IV.  Econometric specification and estimation strategy 
Econometric specification 
The theoretical model in Section II indicates that domestic firms’ average wage depends on 
the presence of FDI firms (i.e., wage spillovers) and a set of other factors, including firm-
 
2 Given the Pareto distribution, the impact of FDI presence on domestic firms’ equilibrium wage depends on 
the shape parameter 𝜇𝜇. 
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specific characteristics. In order to estimate wage spillovers, we further expand equation (12) 
as follows: 
𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽2𝑂𝑂𝑤𝑤𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑒𝑃𝑃𝑠𝑠ℎ𝑆𝑆𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽3𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝐴𝐴𝑔𝑔𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
+  𝛽𝛽4𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝐾𝐾_𝑆𝑆𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖𝑒𝑒𝑙𝑙𝑠𝑠𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽5𝑇𝑇𝑒𝑒𝑇𝑇ℎ𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽6𝐻𝐻𝑒𝑒𝑃𝑃𝑓𝑓𝑆𝑆𝑙𝑙𝑑𝑑𝐺𝐺ℎ𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
+ 𝛽𝛽7𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽8𝑑𝑑𝐹𝐹𝑙𝑙𝑑𝑑𝐼𝐼𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽9𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑒𝑒𝑔𝑔𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽10𝑑𝑑𝑇𝑇𝑆𝑆𝑑𝑑𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 
      In equation (15), the average wage (𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) of domestic firm i in three-digit industry k in 
region j at time t is calculated as total wages (TW) divided by total employment (L), then 
transformed to logarithmic form (𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖). Moreover, the dependent variable is restricted to 
domestic firms to capture FDI impact on domestic firms’ wages and eliminate possible bias 
due to foreign wage premium (Aitken, Harrison, and Lipsey 1996, Barry, Gorg, and Strobl 
2005, Pittiglio, Reganati, and Sica 2015). 
The theoretical model shows that the expected average wage of a domestic firm is a function 




), and the cut–off capability (θ*)3. Of these, foreign presence (FDI) is the 




        
where y is the total employment of firm i in three-digit tourism industry k in region j at time t, 
F is the set of foreign firms and D is the set of domestic firms.  
 
3 The impact of aggregate demand (Φ) is captured by time dummies and regional fixed effect (𝑤𝑤
𝑟𝑟
𝐿𝐿
) is controlled 
by the fixed effects in the regression. Equation (6) suggests that the cut-off capability is a function of a set of 
explanatory variables, including firm characteristics, which is absorbed into the explanatory variables in 
equation (14). Elasticity of substitution (ρ) is an underlying structural parameter embedded in the reduced-
form parameters (βi) in the empirical model. Estimating unobserved structural parameters is not the objective 




Empirical evidence suggests considerable influence of firm characteristics on wage 
differences among domestic firms as well as between domestic and foreign firms (Aitken, 
Harrison, and Lipsey 1996, Hoi and Pomfret 2010, Feliciano and Lipsey 2006, Driffield and 
Girma 2003, Elliott and Zhou 2015, Brown and Medoff 2003). Thus, a vector of firm-level 
variables is included to control for the impact of firm heterogeneity.  
Firm size (𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒) is measured by a domestic firm’s total sales in natural logarithm form. 
Empirical evidence generally finds a positive impact of firm size on wages (Hoi and Pomfret 
2010, Girma, Greenaway, and Wakelin 1999, Sjöholm and Lipsey 2006, Villarreal and 
Sakamoto 2011, Pittiglio, Reganati, and Sica 2015). Compared to small firms, larger firms are 
more financially capable and have well-established compensation policies, allowing them to 
offer better wages.   
The impact of Ownership on wages is controlled by including a dummy variable with the 
value of 1 for privately-owned and 0 for state-owned. State-owned firms generally have strong 
finances for funding wage systems, but are faced with constraints in wage settings. Meanwhile, 
privately-owned firms have considerable flexibility in determining wage structures and 
incentive policies, which may also be subject to unexpected changes due to poor financial 
conditions. Empirical findings show that state-owned firms tend to pay higher than non-state 
counterparts (Hale and Long 2011, De Fraja 1993).  
Firm age (lnAge), measured by years of operation in natural logarithm, can exert a 
contrasting impact on wage determination. On the one hand, newer firms are more likely to 
have higher labour productivity, which may enable them to pay higher wages (Aitken, 
Harrison, and Lipsey 1996). On the other hand, older firms tend to establish a solid foothold in 
the market and are usually larger, which may signal capability to offer higher wages (Villarreal 
and Sakamoto 2011, Hoi and Pomfret 2010, Brown and Medoff 2003).  
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Capital intensity (lnK_intensity) is the ratio of fixed assets to total employment. Higher 
capital intensity implies a lower labour cost share in the total cost structure, which may induce 
firms to meet high wage demands and employ competent high-paid workers. Empirical 
findings support a positive correlation between capital intensity and average wages (Hoi and 
Pomfret 2010, Sjöholm and Lipsey 2006, Villarreal and Sakamoto 2011, Muñoz-Bullón and 
Sánchez-Bueno 2013).  
Technology gap (TechGap) can capture the impact of technological differences on wages. We 
define technology gap as the difference in labour productivity levels between each domestic firm 
and that of average FDI firms in the three-digit industry4. Domestic firms may hardly compete and 
benefit from FDI presence given a large technology gap, which may then lower their wages (Hoi 
and Pomfret 2010). Meanwhile, domestic firms are less likely to gain positive spillovers from FDI 
given a small technological gap due to minimal learning potential. Therefore, technology gap is 
expected to influence wages but the impact direction is mixed (Pittiglio, Reganati, and Sica 2015, 
Conyon et al. 2002). 
The level of product market competition in each industry can contribute to wage differences 
among firms, which is captured by the Herfindahl index (Hoi and Pomfret 2010). In equation 
(15), regional dummies (dRegion), industry dummies (dIndustry) and year dummies (dTime) 
are included to allow average wages to vary across regions, industries and years 5, and 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  is 
an error term. 
Estimation strategy 
 
4 Following the literature, technology gap is proxied by labour productivity gap as an FDI firm’s higher labour 
productivity level is arguably associated with technological differences between foreign and domestic firms. 
5 Note that all domestic firms are subject to the same macroeconomic environment in the host economy, hence 
the effects of macroeconomic factors are captured by the time dummies in the econometric model. 
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The FDI variable is likely to be endogenous due to possible bi-directional causality. To 
address this potential problem, our research employs the feasible two-step generalized method 
of moment estimator with instrumental variable (IV-GMM). It is critical to find appropriate 
instruments that are correlated with the endogenous variable and uncorrelated with the error 
term. We thus construct two instruments. The first instrument, IV1, is the employment share 
of FDI firms in the leather and related products manufacturing industry in region j (a region 
different from where the firm is located) at time t, and the second, IV2, is the employment share 
of FDI firms in the computer, electronic and optical products manufacturing industry in region 
j at time t. These two instruments of FDI shares in these distinctive manufacturing industries 
are matched with tourism FDI presence across the same year t and different regions (namely 
the FDI presence of tourism industry in region j is instrumented by the FDI presence of the two 
manufacturing industries in a region that does not neighbour j). For example, tourism FDI in 
region 1 (i.e., Red River Delta) is instrumented by leather FDI (IV1) and electronics FDI (IV2) 
in region 4 (i.e., Central Highlands). The remaining matched regions include: 2-5; 3-6; 4-1; 5-
2; and 6-3 (see Appendix for the regional map).  
The two IVs are expected to be closely correlated with the potentially endogenous variable 
(i.e., FDI presence in tourism).  Inward FDI in manufacturing and services sectors largely share 
common macro-level determinants at the host economy of Vietnam, including a growing 
domestic market, preferential tax rates, political and macroeconomic stability, strategic 
geographical location, and abundant and cost-competitive workforce.  
Besides, the chosen IVs are unlikely to directly affect the equilibrium wages of domestic 
firms in the tourism industry (i.e., uncorrelated with 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖). Arguably, the leather and electronics 
manufacturing industries demand labour skill sets that are substantially different from those of 
the tourism industry. More importantly, the above-described IV construction ensures that FDI 
firms in these two manufacturing industries are located in a region non-adjacent to that of 
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tourism domestic firms. The matched regions are distinctive in various respects, including real 
wage differences as observed consistently in our sample for both domestic and FDI firms (see 
Table 4).   
In the following analysis, the endogeneity test is implemented to verify whether FDI is 
endogenous or not. The test, based on the C-statistics, specifies a null hypothesis that the 
regressor can be treated as exogenous. A rejection of the null implies that the variable is 
endogenous. Then, the under-identification and over-identification tests are conducted to check 
whether the instruments are appropriate. The under-identification test is an LM test of whether 
the instruments are relevant (i.e., correlated with the endogenous regressor). For over-
identification, the Sargan-Hansen test has a joint null hypothesis that the instruments are valid 
(i.e., uncorrelated with the error term). A rejection of the null in the under-identification test 
and a failure to reject the null in the over-identification test confirm the relevance and validity 
of the instruments. 
V.  Data  
The empirical analysis uses a rich panel dataset of tourism firms in Vietnam during 2009–
2013. As the tourism industry encompasses a diverse range of cross-cutting activities, this 
research focuses on firms categorised in Section I of Vietnam Standard Industrial Classification 
(VSIC), namely accommodation and food services. This section represents the core activities 
of the tourism industry (UNCTAD, 2007). The data were obtained from enterprise surveys 
commissioned by the National General Statistics Office (GSO). These surveys provide 
information on firms’ characteristics and operation indicators, including location, ownership, 
sales, employment, costs, profits, and assets. The final dataset is a five-year unbalanced panel 
constructed after screening data for systematic missing values and outliers. Monetary variables 
are measured in the national currency (VND) and deflated to 2009 price using the CPI.  
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Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics. The figures suggest considerable variations within 
continuous variables, reflecting the heterogeneity of firms in the sample. Regarding the 
ownership structure, 98.60 percent of domestic firms are privately owned. The average 
Herfindahl index capturing the product market concentration is relatively low (0.03), hence 
tourism can be categorized as a monopolistically competitive industry6. Finally, FDI firms 
exhibit a reasonable presence, constituting 13.34 percent of employment in the industry-region. 
The maximum employment share of FDI firms is 38.01 percent, and the minimum share is 
zero, implying no FDI presence.     
[Insert Table 2 here] 
Table 3 shows average real wages of FDI, domestic and all firms across VSIC three-digit 
industries. The highest paying industry among FDI firms is short-term accommodation 
(including hotels and resorts), which is also the largest invested industry, comprising more than 
55% of foreign firms in the sample. Notably, the foreign-domestic pay gaps across industries 
are significant at 2.96 times (short-term accommodation), 2.09 times (beverage serving 
activities), 1.56 times (event catering), and 1.38 times (restaurants and mobile food services). 
Overall, foreign firms pay considerably higher than domestic counterparts in FDI-present 
three-digit industries with an average wage premium of 2.25 times.   
[Insert Table 3 here] 
Table 4 reports the real wage differences between domestic and FDI firms across regions. 
Among FDI firms, the highest paying region is Southeast (including Ho Chi Minh City – the 
economic centre), and the lowest one is the Northern Midland and Mountain. Meanwhile, 
 
6 Furthermore, to capture the level of labour market concentration in the examined industry, we calculated an 
index that is similar to the Herfindahl index, namely the sum of squared share of firm’s employment (number of 
workers) in the industry. If the labour market is very different from being competitive, we shall observe a high 
value of this index (namely the market is highly concentrated). The calculated average value is notably low at 
0.001, implying approximately perfect competition. Thus, the tourism industry can plausibly fit the framework 
constructed by the theoretical model in Section III. 
19 
 
domestic firms pay the highest and lowest in Red River Delta (including Hanoi – the capital city) 
and Mekong River Delta, respectively. Generally, FDI firms pay much higher than domestic 
counterparts, regardless of geographical locations. Nevertheless, the foreign-domestic pay gaps 
are more substantial compared to those across three-digit industries. The smallest gap is found in 
the Northern area where FDI firms pay approximately 1.5 times higher than domestic firms.  
[Insert Table 4 here] 
VI. Empirical results and discussions 
Wage spillovers from FDI to domestic firms 
 The specified model is estimated using the dataset of firms in Vietnam’s tourism industry 
from 2009 to 2013. The IV-GMM estimator is employed to deal with the possible endogeneity 
problem. Robust standard errors are computed to account for arbitrary heteroscedasticity. Table 
5 reports the main estimation results, which include all explanatory variables in column (1). 
Furthermore, the model is re-estimated without capital intensity variable (K_intensity), which 
has the largest number of missing observations (as shown in Table 2) and the results are 
reported in column (2). Finally, to further capture spillovers at regional level, we include two 
additional variables (estimation in column (3)), namely regional training (Regtrain) (measured 
by percentage of trained employed workers at 15 years of age and above across regions and 
years) and regional market size (Regsize) (measured by average GDP per capita across regions 
and years). Overall, the signs of key explanatory variables, notably foreign presence (FDI), 
remain consistent and the coefficients are relatively close to each other across the three 
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estimations. Given the robustness of the result on FDI-linked wage spillovers, the following 
discussion is based on the estimation of the original model reported in column (1)7.   
[Insert Table 5 here] 
The Wald test for the overall model significance indicates that the coefficients are jointly 
significant at the one percent level with the F-statistic being 101.94. The concordance statistic 
C is 21.429 with the p-value < 0.01, indicating a rejection of the null hypothesis. This result 
suggests that foreign presence (FDI) is endogenous, hence the IV-GMM is an appropriate 
estimation approach. The under-identification test reports the Kleibergen-Paap rk LM test 
statistic of 665.8570 with p-value < 0.01. Therefore, we can reject the null hypothesis, namely 
excluded instruments are irrelevant. Moreover, the Hansen J statistic from the over-
identification test is 0.004 with the p-value > 0.1. Thus, we fail to reject the null hypothesis 
that the selected instruments are valid and correctly excluded from the estimated equation. 
 The estimations confirm the existence of wage spillovers from FDI to domestic firms. While 
FDI firms pay much higher, they appear not to put upward pressure on average wages of 
domestic counterparts. The coefficient of foreign presence (FDI) is negative and statistically 
significant at one percent level. Accordingly, a one percent increase in FDI presence will lower 
domestic firms’ average wages by 2.0339 percent. This finding is interesting since previous 
studies mostly suggest positive wage spillovers. One study revealing negative spillovers is 
Barry, Gorg, and Strobl (2005) for the case of domestic exporting firms in Ireland’s 
manufacturing industry. The authors attribute the result to the labour market crowding out 
effect when FDI firms attract the best workers away from the local firms via higher wages.    
 
7 We have conducted an additional estimation that controls for a major institutional factor in Vietnam’s labour 
market, namely the minimum wage. Unsurprisingly, it is found to exert a positive impact on the local wages 
with a one per cent increase in the minimum wage causing domestic firms to raise average wages by 3.958 per 
cent. For the coefficient estimate of the variable of interest (foreign presence, FDI), it remains highly consistent 
with that of the estimation without the control of minimum wage, in terms of both sign and magnitude. To 
save space, we do not report the estimation results, which are available upon request. 
21 
 
 In fact, as shown in the theoretical model in Section III, it is possible that the impact of FDI 
is negative, as FDI presence generates two contrasting effects on the expected average wage. On 
the one hand, FDI affects domestic firms via productivity spillovers (a direct channel), and on 
the other hand, it also creates an indirect impact via the cut-off capability (an indirect channel). 
If FDI generates positive productivity spillovers (namely the direct channel being positive), 
which tends to increase firms’ average wages due to increase in the marginal product of labour, 
it lowers the cut-off capability. Subsequently, firms that previously cannot survive will now enter 
the industry, which lowers firms’ expected average wages. Similarly, if there are negative 
productivity spillovers that lower firms’ average wages, the cut-off capability will be raised and 
expected firm average wages will be increased. The significantly negative estimate in Table 5 
occurs as one channel dominates the other. 
 Table 5 also shows that most control variables have considerable influence on firms’ wages. 
The coefficient of lnSize is positive and statistically significant at one percent level. 
Specifically, a one percent increase in firm size leads to a 0.1304 percent increase in average 
wages. Larger firms usually exhibit stronger financial capacity and adopt better compensation 
practices, which allow them to pay higher than smaller firms (Hoi and Pomfret 2010, Girma, 
Greenaway, and Wakelin 1999, Pittiglio, Reganati, and Sica 2015). Meanwhile, the coefficient 
of the variable Ownership is negative but statistically insignificant. This finding suggests that 
ownership structure is not a major determinant explaining differences in domestic firms’ 
average wages in the examined industry.   
 Firm age also contributes to differences in domestic firms’ wages. The coefficient of lnAge 
is positive and statistically significant. A one percent increase in firm age causes a 0.0232 
percent increase in average wages. This finding is consistent with previous studies (Villarreal 
and Sakamoto 2011, Hoi and Pomfret 2010, Pittiglio, Reganati, and Sica 2015). Older firms 
tend to build up a well-established market share and be larger, which may signal capability to 
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pay higher. Similarly, the coefficient of lnK_intensity is positive and statistically significant. A 
one percent increase in this variable leads to a 0.0365 percent increase in average wages. Higher 
capital intensity implies a lower labour cost share in the total cost structure, which may enable 
firms to meet wage demands and employ more competent high-paid workers (Sjöholm and 
Lipsey 2006, Villarreal and Sakamoto 2011, Muñoz-Bullón and Sánchez-Bueno 2013).  
 In contrast, Table 5 shows that the technology gap (TechGap) and competition (Herfindahl) 
exert negative and statistically significant influence on domestic firms’ average wages. 
Accordingly, a larger technology gap tends to induce domestic firms to pay lower on average 
as it implies weaker absorptive capacity to benefit from FDI. Nonetheless, the impact of 
TechGap seems modest with the coefficient being 0.0001. Competition has a more profound 
effect with a one percent increase in competitive pressure (i.e., decrease in Herfindahl index) 
putting upward pressure on domestic firms’ average wages by 1.4675 percent. Arguably, 
domestic firms are driven to pay higher to attract and retain a productive workforce in a highly 
competitive product market. Similar results are found in Hoi and Pomfret (2010) for wage 
spillovers from FDI to Vietnam’s manufacturing firms.  
 Equation (15) is also estimated for subgroups of firms to further examine the role of firm 
characteristics in determining wage spillovers. Arguably, domestic firms with different features 
will respond differently to foreign presence whereas FDI firms with different attributes will be 
likely to exert divergent influence on domestic firms (Nguyen and Sun 2012, Smeets 2008, Hoi 
and Pomfret 2010, Farole, Winkler, and World 2014). Therefore, further analysis of firm 
heterogeneity could provide deeper insights into the FDI impact on domestic firms’ wages.  
Privately-owned versus state-owned firms 
 Table 6 reports the estimations by domestic firms’ ownership, indicating substantial wage 
spilovers to privately-owned firms. Meanwhile, state-owned firms’ average wages appear not 
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to be affected by FDI firms. This finding can be attributed to the rigid wage setting of state-
owned firms in Vietnam, which may reduce flexibility in wage adjustment. Furthermore, state-
owned firms account for less than one percent and about 10 percent of total firm number and 
total employment in the examined industry, respectively. This modest presence together with 
fixed compensation mechanism makes state-owned firms, on average, less likely to face fierce 
competition from FDI counterparts, causing insignificant variation in their average wages. 
[Insert Table 6 here] 
Small versus large firms 
 Table 7 shows that both small and large firms’ average wages experience negative wage 
spillovers from FDI, with a more pronounced effect on the former. Domestic firms of small 
scale are less likely to benefit from FDI-linked productivity spillovers and compete with 
higher-paying FDI firms (and large domestic firms alike) for competent workers in the local 
labour market (Pittiglio, Reganati, and Sica 2015, Sjöholm and Lipsey 2006, Villarreal and 
Sakamoto 2011). Hence, this group is more likely to be left with less skilled and lower paid 
workforce given increased FDI presence. The sample shows that small domestic firms are the 
lowest paying, with the average wage being nearly 38 percent of FDI firms, and 73 percent of 
large domestic firms.      
[Insert Table 7 here] 
Young versus old firms 
Table 8 presents the estimations by market experience of domestic firms. While FDI 
presence exerts negative and significant influence on wages of both groups, the effects are more 
profound for newly established firms. Young firms tend to be more exposed to external forces, 
including the entry of foreign affiliates in the host labour market. They might be less able to 
compete with FDI firms (and well-established domestic firms) to attract and build up a 
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productive workforce via high wages. Besides, our data shows that on average, young domestic 
firms pay about 10 percent and 57 percent less than old domestic and FDI firms, respectively. 
These factors might explain stronger negative wage spillovers from FDI firms to young 
domestic counterparts. 
[Insert Table 8 here] 
 
Wholly foreign-owned versus partially foreign-owned firms 
Table 9 reports the findings across two main types of FDI, namely the wholly foreign-owned 
and partially foreign-owned firms (or joint ventures with local partners). The estimations 
suggest that only wholly foreign-owned firms generate significant influence on domestic 
counterparts’ average wages. Whereas, there is no evidence of such spillover effects from 
partially foreign-owned firms in the examined industry. Compared to joint ventures, firms with 
full foreign equity might possess greater ownership advantages (including superior 
management, marketing and hiring practices) extensively transferred from their parent 
companies, enabling them to compete and exert stronger impact on the host labour market. 
While this finding provides preliminary insights, more in-depth analysis is warranted to better 
understand the role of heterogeneous FDI in determining the extent of wage spillovers.            
[Insert Table 9 here] 
VII. Concluding remarks 
This paper explores the role of FDI as a determinant of domestic firms’ average wages. We 
construct a theoretical model to demonstrate different spillover channels. Then, we estimate 
the econometric model, using firm-level data of Vietnam’s tourism industry during 2009–2013. 
The sample shows that FDI firms pay much higher wages than domestic counterparts with an 
average wage gap of 2.25 times. However, the estimation suggests negative wage spillovers 
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with a one percent increase in FDI presence lowering domestic firms’ expected average wages 
by 2.03 percent. Furthermore, domestic and foreign firms’ characteristics are found to play an 
important role in determining the magnitude of wage spillovers. Three major implications can 
be drawn from the findings. 
First, domestic firms are likely to experience two contrasting situations given the increased 
FDI presence in the industry and region. On the one hand, they can benefit from the negative 
wage spillovers since lower average wages indicate lower labour costs. On the other hand, they 
might encounter intense competition from higher paying FDI firms in the local labour market. 
Consequently, domestic firms may struggle to attract high-quality workers. Affected firms are 
recommended to take advantage of the first positive situation to reduce production costs and 
increase profitability. This may then enable domestic firms to overcome the adverse impact of 
the second situation effectively in the long run.   
Second, local workers in FDI firms are unambiguously better-off when they are paid much 
higher than their fellow workers in domestic firms. However, a large proportion of the local 
workforce appears to suffer from the foreign presence. In fact, FDI firms account for nearly 13.5 
percent of total employment in the industry-region while the rest of the workforce is employed 
in domestic firms. Therefore, a negative wage spillover effect is likely to exert a considerable 
impact on the majority of the local labour force in the tourism industry. Nonetheless, the 
ultimate outcome of the FDI impact on local wages is undetermined yet.   
Third, the empirical results imply significant heterogeneity of wage spillovers from FDI firms 
in the examined industry. Notably, spillover effect is found only for privately-owned firms but not 
for state-owned ones. Furthermore, compared to large and well-established domestic firms, small 
and newly-established domestic firms encounter more pronounced negative wage spillovers from 
FDI. Additional analysis reveals that fully foreign-owned firms are the key players in affecting 
local firms’ wages whereas joint ventures show insignificant impact. These heterogeneous effects 
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highlight the relevance and importance of a firm-level approach in quantifying FDI-induced wage 
spillovers and formulating FDI policies related to local labour markets.  
This study has attempted to make both theoretical and empirical contributions to the literature 
on FDI-linked wage spillovers. With the availability of relevant data, future work would be able to 
extend the empirical exercise by exploring the role of worker characteristics, such as skill, tenure, 




Acknowledgements: The authors would like to thank the participants at the Australian 
Conference of Economists (ACE2017– Sydney) for their helpful comments and suggestions. 
The Australian Government’s research funding through an Endeavour Award is also gratefully 
appreciated. All errors remain the authors’.   





Aitken, Brian, Ann Harrison, and Robert E. Lipsey. 1996. "Wages and Foreign Ownership A 
Comparative Study of Mexico, Venezuela, and the United States."  Journal of 
International Economics 40 (3):345-371. 
Anwar, Sajid, and Sizhong Sun. 2012. "Trade Liberalisation, Market Competition and Wage 
Inequality in China's Manufacturing Sector."  Economic Modelling 29 (4):1268-1277. 
Axarloglou, Kostas, and Mike Pournarakis. 2007. "Do All Foreign Direct Investment Inflows 
Benefit the Local Economy?"  The World Economy 30 (3):424-445. 
Barry, Frank, Holger Gorg, and Eric Strobl. 2005. "Foreign Direct Investment and Wages in 
Domestic Firms in Ireland: Productivity Spillovers Versus Labour-market Crowding 
Out."  International Journal of the Economics of Business 12 (1):67. 
Brown, Charles, and James Medoff. 2003. "Firm Age and Wages."  Journal of Labor 
Economics 21 (3):677-697. doi: 10.1086/374963. 
Chaudhuri, Sarbajit, and Dibyendu Banerjee. 2010. "Foreign Capital Inflow, Skilled–unskilled 
Wage Inequality and Unemployment of Unskilled Labour in a Fair Wage Model."  
Economic Modelling 27 (1):477-486. 
Chidambaran Iyer, G. 2012. "Wage Spillovers in Indian Manufacturing."  Singapore Economic 
Review 57 (1). doi: 10.1142/S0217590812500063. 
Coniglio, Nicola D, Francesco Prota, and Adnan Seric. 2015. "Foreign Direct Investment, 
Employment and Wages in Sub‐Saharan Africa."  Journal of International 
Development 27 (7):1243-1266. 
Conyon, Martin J., Sourafel Girma, Steve Thompson, and Peter W. Wright. 2002. "The 
Productivity and Wage Effects of Foreign Acquisition in the United Kingdom."  The 
Journal of Industrial Economics 50 (1):85-102. 
De Fraja, Giovanni. 1993. "Unions and Wages in Public and Private Firms: A Game-theoretic 
Analysis."  Oxford Economic Papers:457-469. 
Driffield, Nigel, and Sourafel Girma. 2003. "Regional Foreign Direct Investment and Wage 
Spillovers: Plant Level Evidence from the UK Electronics Industry."  Oxford Bulletin 
of Economics and Statistics 65 (4):453-474. 
Elliott, R. J. R., and Y. Zhou. 2015. "Co-location and Spatial Wage Spillovers in China: The 
Role of Foreign Ownership and Trade."  World Development 66:629-644. 
Farole, Thomas, Deborah Winkler, and Bank World. 2014. Making foreign direct investment 
work for Sub-Saharan Africa: local spillovers and competitiveness in global value 
chains. Washington, DC: The World Bank. 
Feliciano, Zadia M., and Robert E. Lipsey. 2006. "Foreign Ownership, Wages, and Wage 




General Statistics Office of Vietnam (GSO). 2017. Labour force by industry. 
Girma, Sourafel, David Greenaway, and Katharine Wakelin. 1999. Wages, Productivity and 
Foreign Ownership in UK Manufacturing: Centre for Research on Globalisation and 
Labour Markets. 
Görg, Holger, Eric Strobl, and Frank Walsh. 2007. "Why Do Foreign-Owned Firms Pay More? 
The Role of On-the-Job Training."  Review of World Economics / Weltwirtschaftliches 
Archiv 143 (3):464-482. doi: 10.1007/s10290-007-0117-9. 
Hale, Galina, and Cheryl Long. 2011. "Did Foreign Direct Investment Put an Upward Pressure 
on Wages in China."  IMF Economic Review 59 (3):404-430. doi: 
10.1057/imfer.2011.14. 
Harding, Torfinn, and Beata S. Javorcik. 2011. "Roll Out the Red Carpet and They Will Come: 
Investment Promotion and FDI Inflows*."  The Economic Journal 121 (557):1445-
1476. 
Hoi, Le Quoc, and Richard Pomfret. 2010. "Foreign Direct Investment and Wage Spillovers in 
Vietnam: Evidence from Firm Level Data."  ASEAN Economic Bulletin 27 (2):159-172. 
Huang, Youxing, and Yan Zhang. 2017. "Wage, foreign-owned firms, and productivity 
spillovers via labour turnover: a non-linear analysis based on Chinese firm-level data."  
Applied Economics 49 (20):1994-2010. doi: 10.1080/00036846.2016.1231899. 
Javorcik, Beata Smarzynska. 2004. "Does Foreign Direct Investment Increase the Productivity 
of Domestic Firms? In Search of Spillovers through Backward Linkages."  The 
American Economic Review 94 (3):605-627. 
Kathuria, Vinish. 2001. "Foreign firms, technology transfer and knowledge spillovers to Indian 
manufacturing firms: a stochastic frontier analysis."  Applied Economics 33 (5):625-
642. doi: 10.1080/00036840121940. 
Lipsey, Robert E., and Fredrik Sjöholm. 2004. "FDI and Wage Spillovers in Indonesian 
Manufacturing."  Review of World Economics 140 (2):321-332. 
Muñoz-Bullón, Fernando, and Maria J. Sánchez-Bueno. 2013. "Multinational Enterprises and 
Domestic Wages: The Contingent Effect of Skill Composition."  International Business 
Review 22 (6):918-931. doi: 10.1016/j.ibusrev.2013.01.009. 
Newman, Carol, John Rand, Theodore Talbot, and Finn Tarp. 2015. "Technology transfers, 
foreign investment and productivity spillovers."  European Economic Review 76:168-
187. 
Nguyen, Dao Thi Hong, and Sizhong Sun. 2012. "FDI and Domestic Firms’ Export Behaviour: 
Evidence from Vietnam."  Economic Papers: A Journal of Applied Economics and 
Policy 31 (3):380-390. 
Pittiglio, Rosanna, Filippo Reganati, and Edgardo Sica. 2015. "Do Multinational Enterprises 
Push up the Wages of Domestic Firms in the Italian Manufacturing Sector?"  The 
Manchester School 83 (3):346-378. doi: 10.1111/manc.12076. 
30 
 
Sjöholm, Fredrik, and Robert E Lipsey. 2006. "Foreign Firms and Indonesian Manufacturing 
Wages: An Analysis with Panel Data."  Economic Development and Cultural Change 
55 (1):201-221. doi: 10.1086/505723. 
Smeets, R. A. L. M. 2008. "Collecting the Pieces of the FDI Knowledge Spillovers Puzzle."  
The World Bank research observer 23 (2):107-138. doi: 10.1093/wbro/lkn003. 
Srithanpong, Thanapol. 2014. Productivity and Wage Spillovers from FDI in Thailand: 
Evidence from Plant-level Analysis. Bangkok: Thailand Development Research 
Institute Foundation (TDRI). 
Taylor, Karl, and Nigel Driffield. 2005. "Wage Inequality and the Role of Multinationals: 
Evidence from UK Panel Data."  Labour Economics 12 (2):223-249. doi: 
10.1016/j.labeco.2003.11.003. 
Tomohara, Akinori, and Sadayuki Takii. 2011. "Does Globalization Benefit Developing 
Countries? Effects of FDI on Local Wages."  Journal of Policy Modeling 33 (3):511-
521. 
UNCTAD. 2017. "World Investment Report 2017." 
https://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/wir2017_en.pdf. 
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD). 2007. FDI in Tourism: 
The Development Dimension. New York and Geneva: United Nations. 
Villarreal, Andrés, and Arthur Sakamoto. 2011. "Bringing the Firms into Globalization 
Research: The Effects of Foreign Investment and Exports on Wages in Mexican 
Manufacturing Firms."  Social Science Research 40 (3):885-901. doi: 
10.1016/j.ssresearch.2010.12.011. 
World Economic Forum. 2017. The Travel & Tourism Competitiveness Report 2017. Geneva: 
World Economic Forum. 
31 
 
Appendix: Regional map of mainland Vietnam 
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Table 1. Summary of related literature. 
Study Country Level of analysis Study period Sector Main findings of FDI-induced wage spillovers 







 Mexico (1984-1990) 
Venezuela (1977-1989) 
The US (1987) 
Manufacturing - Insignificant for Mexico and Venezuela - Positive for the US 
Feliciano and Lipsey 
(2006) The US 
Firm-level, 
country-specific 1987, 1992 
Manufacturing and 
non-manufacturing 
- Insignificant for manufacturing 
- Positive for non-manufacturing 
Axarloglou and 
Pournarakis (2007) The US 
Industry-level, 
country-specific 1974-1994 Manufacturing 
- Overall weak spillovers 
- Effects vary across industries and states 
Girma, Greenaway, and 
Wakelin (1999) The UK 
Firm-level, 
country-specific  1991-1996 Manufacturing - Insignificant 
Driffield and Girma 
(2003) The UK 
Firm-level, 
country-specific  1980-1992 
Electronics 
manufacturing - Positive 
Barry, Gorg, and Strobl 
(2005) Ireland 
Firm-level, 
country-specific 1990-1998 Manufacturing 
- Negative for domestic exporting firms 
- Insignificant for domestic non-exporting firms 
Muñoz-Bullón and 
Sánchez-Bueno (2013) Spain 
Firm-level, 
country-specific 1992-2008 Manufacturing - Insignificant 
Pittiglio, Reganati, and 
Sica (2015) Italy 
Firm-level, 
country-specific  2002-2007 Manufacturing - Insignificant 
Villarreal and 
Sakamoto (2011) Mexico 
Firm-level, 
country-specific  2001 Manufacturing - Positive 
Lipsey and Sjöholm 
(2004) Indonesia 
Firm-level, 
country-specific 1996 Manufacturing  - Positive 
Tomohara and Takii 
(2011) Indonesia 
Firm-level, 
country-specific 1989-1996 Manufacturing - Positive 
Hale and Long (2011) China Firm-level, country-specific 2001 
Manufacturing and 
services 
- Positive for domestic privately owned firms 
- Insignificant for domestic state owned firms 




country-specific 1989-2004 Manufacturing 
- Positive for FDI measured at four-digit level  
- Negative for FDI measured at three-digit level 
Srithanpong (2014) Thailand Firm-level, country-specific 2007 Manufacturing - Positive 
Hoi and Pomfret (2010) Vietnam  Firm-level, country-specific 2000-2010  Manufacturing - Positive 
33 
 
Table 2. Summary statistics of key variables. 
Variable Obs Mean S.D Min Max 
Average wage (𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑤𝑤) 33,211 2.7876 0.5279 -4.2658 6.5977 
Foreign presence (FDI) 33,738 0.1334 0.0981 0.0000 0.3801 
Firm size (lnSize) 33,195 6.2469 1.7391 -1.5578 14.6265 
Ownership structure (Own) 33,211 0.9860 0.1175 0 1 
Firm age (lnAge) 32,313 1.4383 0.7505 0.0000 4.1897 
Capital intensity (lnK_intensity) 24,970 3.8370 1.8750 -4.1825 11.3806 
Technology gap (TechGap) 32,694 154.0922 660.7731 -99427.35 590.0299 





Table 3. Average real wage by three-digit industry and ownership. 
VSIC 










I551 Short-term accommodation 53.6834 18.1556 18.7151 
I559 Other accommodation N.A. 24.1005 24.1005 
I561 Restaurants and mobile food services 26.0139 18.9142 19.0314 
I562 Event catering 33.3975 21.4494 21.6097 
I563 Beverage serving activities 36.0214 17.2545 17.2805 




Table 4. Average real wage by region and ownership. 
No. Region Average real wage (FDI firms) 
Average real wage 
(Domestic firms) 
Average real 
wage (All firms) 
1 Red River Delta 41.1582 20.8046 21.5386 
2 Northern Midland & Mountain 26.7577 17.9042 18.0468 
3 Central Coast 29.4456 16.5769 16.7448 
4 Central Highlands 29.5450 17.6969 17.7525 
5 Southeast 53.3053 19.1587 19.4809 
6 Mekong River Delta 46.2324 15.6672 15.7769 





Table 5. Estimation results for FDI-linked wage spillovers. 
 
Variable 
(1) (2) (3) 
Coef. S.E Coef. S.E Coef. S.E 
Foreign presence (FDI) -2.0339*** 0.3840 -1.6897*** 0.3260 -2.4625*** 0.7590 
Firm size (lnSize) 0.1304*** 0.0054 0.1411*** 0.0048 0.1295*** 0.0055 
Ownership structure (Own) -0.0090 0.0501 -0.0137 0.0492 -0.0112 0.0502 
Firm age (lnAge) 0.0232*** 0.0089 0.0231*** 0.0076 0.0236*** 0.0089 
Capital intensity (lnK_intensity) 0.0365*** 0.0036 No  0.0363*** 0.0037 
Technology gap (TechGap) -0.0001*** 0.0000 -0.0001*** 0.0000 -0.0001*** 0.0000 
Competition (Herfindahl) -1.4675*** 0.3117 -1.7379*** 0.2783 -1.5255*** 0.3271 
Regional training (Regtrain) No  No  0.0017 0.0068 
Regional market size (Regsize) No  No  -0.0040 0.0027 
Regional dummies (dRegion) Yes  Yes  Yes  
Industry dummies (dIndustry) Yes  Yes  Yes  
Year dummies (dTime) Yes  Yes  Yes  
Kleibergen-Paap rk LM statistic 665.8570*** 1107.2080*** 223.3440*** 
Hansen J statistic 0.0040 1.3680 2.0140 
C-statistic 21.4290*** 19.1640*** 9.1980*** 
F-value 101.9400 *** 148.8500*** 91.3600*** 
Obs 20,715  28,484   20, 715   
Notes: (i) Results (1) include all explannatory variables; (2) exclude lnK_intensity; and (3) include additional regional 





Table 6. FDI wage spillovers by ownership structure of domestic firms. 
Variable 
Privately-owned firms State-owned firms 
Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E. 
Foreign presence (FDI) -2.0791*** 0.3878 -3.7271 2.4269 
Firm size (lnSize) 0.1301*** 0.0055 0.0214 0.0429 
Firm age (lnAge) 0.0232** 0.0091 -0.0449 0.0442 
Capital intensity (lnK_intensity) 0.0363*** 0.0037 0.0180 0.0243 
Technology gap (TechGap) -0.0001*** 0.0000 -0.0011*** 0.0003 
Competition (Herfindahl) -1.5482*** 0.3165 -0.0262 2.3844 
Regional dummies (dRegion) Yes  Yes  
Industry dummies (dIndustry) Yes  Yes  
Year dummies (dTime) Yes   Yes   
Kleibergen-Paap rk LM statistic 656.3360***  27.178***   
Hansen J statistic 0.0820  0.0240  
C-statistic 22.1600***  0.9660  
F-statistic 105.4900***  5.700***  
Obs 20,251   426   




Table 7. FDI wage spillovers by size of domestic firms. 
Variable 
Small firms Large firms 
Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E. 
Foreign presence (FDI) -3.4280*** 1.1357 -1.3101*** 0.3916 
Ownership structure (Own) -0.3851 0.2428 -0.0547 0.0553 
Firm age (lnAge) 0.0416*** 0.0145 0.0273** 0.0125 
Capital intensity (lnK_intensity) 0.0101* 0.0060 0.0509*** 0.0053 
Technology gap (TechGap) -0.0039*** 0.0003 -0.0002*** 0.0000 
Competition (Herfindahl) -0.8820 0.9381 -0.8017** 0.3810 
Regional dummies (dRegion) Yes  Yes  
Industry dummies (dIndustry) Yes  Yes  
Year dummies (dTime) Yes   Yes   
Kleibergen-Paap rk LM statistic 243.1580***  375.0010***   
Hansen J statistic 0.1190  2.1980  
C-statistic 4.6450**  10.1940***  
F-statistic 43.8300***  39.2700***  
Obs 8,492   10,313   
Notes: (i) A small firm has the size of less than or equal to the sample mean; (ii) A large firm has the size 




Table 8. FDI wage spillovers by age of domestic firms. 
 
Variable 
Young firms Old firms 
Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E. 
Foreign presence (FDI) -3.3704*** 0.9277 -1.3748** 0.5483 
Firm size (lnSize) 0.1285*** 0.0106 0.1265*** 0.0070 
Ownership structure (Own) 0.1206 0.1818 -0.0454 0.0551 
Capital intensity (lnK_intensity) 0.0369*** 0.0068 0.0340*** 0.0050 
Technology gap (TechGap) -0.0002*** 0.0001 -0.0002*** 0.0000 
Competition (Herfindahl) -0.6093 0.8251 -1.1590*** 0.3909 
Regional dummies (dRegion) Yes  Yes  
Industry dummies (dIndustry) Yes  Yes  
Year dummies (dTime) Yes   Yes   
Kleibergen-Paap rk LM statistic 147.7190***  281.2820***   
Hansen J statistic 0.3580  0.2920  
C-statistic 10.1290***  4.6490**  
F-statistic 33.8300***  54.0100***  
Obs 7,213   10,728   
Notes: (i) A young firm has the age of less than or equal to the sample mean; (ii) An old firm has the age 












Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E. 
Foreign presence (FDI) -2.7831*** 0.6424 0.1717 0.1198 
Firm size (lnSize) 0.1302*** 0.0061 0.1323*** 0.0054 
Ownership structure (Own) -0.0330 0.0567 -0.0154 0.0486 
Firm age (lnAge) 0.0083 0.0106 0.0253*** 0.0089 
Capital intensity (lnK_intensity) 0.0367*** 0.0041 0.0390*** 0.0036 
Technology gap (TechGap) -0.0002*** 0.0001 -0.0001*** 0.0000 
Competition (Herfindahl) -0.9899*** 0.3620 -1.4546*** 0.3168 
Regional dummies (dRegion) Yes  Yes  
Industry dummies (dIndustry) Yes  Yes  
Year dummies (dTime) Yes   Yes   
Kleibergen-Paap rk LM statistic 69.3310***  751.3710***   
Hansen J statistic 2.2660  26.907***  
C-statistic 26.3020***  2.9820  
F-statistic 86.1900***  101.340***  
Obs 20,715   20,715   
Note: *** and ** denote one and five percent levels of significance, respectively. 
 
 
